Digital Authoritarianism in Russia and China

In 1996, John Perry Barlow envisioned cyberspace as a borderless, free realm beyond government interference, as detailed in his “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.” Decades later, the optimism surrounding the internet as a democratizing force has significantly waned, notably highlighted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's speech in 2010 at The Newseum, which warned of the internet's dual potential for liberation and repression. Today, digital authoritarianism has emerged distinctly in China and Russia, each developing unique yet complementary methods to regulate cyberspace, posing substantial implications for global internet governance.

Historically, both China and Russia had a culture of strict control of information long before the advent of the internet. China’s rigorous media control during the Mao era established a precedent for the contemporary regime's digital censorship. Russia similarly leveraged state control during the Soviet period, with surveillance and propaganda deeply integrated into governance mechanisms.

China’s digital authoritarianism is epitomized by the "Great Firewall," a complex system integrating legal regulations, technological barriers, and extensive human moderation. Contrary to what one may expect in today’s AI age, China's censorship efforts heavily rely on manual content moderation by human moderators alongside artificial intelligence algorithms, as shown by platforms like Bilibili, where nearly a third of employees were engaged in content moderation by 2020. Furthermore, platforms such as WeChat, Douyin, and Weibo are mandated to enforce censorship actively under legal frameworks like the Cybersecurity Law of 2017, which obliges companies to remove prohibited content and share user data upon government request. China’s comprehensive legal framework, including the Data Security Law enacted in 2021, further extends governmental authority over data and network security.

Russia's approach differs significantly from China's, though it shares the overarching goal of internet control. Following widespread protests perceived as externally influenced in 2011, Russia initiated substantial regulatory measures such as the "Blacklist Bill" (2012), granting authorities extensive powers to restrict online content under the guise of public safety. Subsequent legislation, notably the "Lugovoi Law" (2014), enabled the state to intensify restrictions on online dissent and opposition media outlets. As restrictions escalated, the "Sovereign Internet Law" (2019) was put in place, allowing Russia to sever ties from the global internet for national security purposes, marking a pivotal escalation in digital isolation.

Technologically, Russia has sought to establish the RuNet, a national internet infrastructure aiming to reduce dependency on foreign technologies. Efforts have focused on data localization and a domestic Domain Name System (DNS), despite substantial technical challenges. Unlike China, Russia's strategy initially allowed greater access to global digital platforms, resorting instead to coercion and legal intimidation to enforce compliance. However, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 drastically intensified internet control, with significant restrictions imposed on Western platforms and independent media, though technical limitations still leave some circumvention methods accessible.

Both China and Russia actively engage in international governance structures, notably participating in ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC), advocating for increased state control in global internet governance through bodies like the United Nations' International Telecommunication Union. This ideological struggle between the multistakeholder model advocated by Western nations and the state-centric model championed by authoritarian regimes presents a fundamental challenge to internet freedom globally.

The implications of digital authoritarianism extend beyond domestic borders, influencing global internet governance. China's robust internet economy with platforms like Baidu and Alibaba demonstrates a comprehensive domestic alternative to Western internet services, enhancing its global influence and providing a model for other authoritarian states. Conversely, Russia’s challenges in creating competitive domestic alternatives and incomplete infrastructure highlight vulnerabilities inherent in its more coercive model without robust state support for innovation.

The rise of digital authoritarianism has significant implications for democratic states, particularly regarding national security and data sovereignty. This trend is exemplified by recent U.S. concerns over data privacy linked to foreign-owned platforms like TikTok, signaling growing nationalist policies aimed at protecting domestic data from foreign exploitation, potentially contributing to internet fragmentation.

Addressing the challenges posed by digital authoritarianism requires robust international collaboration to reinforce open internet principles and combat disinformation. Without coordinated global action, led by democratically-minded states, the restrictive policies exemplified by these countries could increasingly serve as blueprints for other states, hastening the erosion of the internet as a global common and threatening foundational democratic values.